Abstract. We introduce the linear centralizer method for a passive adversary to extract the shared key in group-theory based key exchange protocols (KEPs). We apply this method to obtain a polynomial time cryptanalysis of the Commutator KEP, introduced by Anshel-Anshel-Goldfeld in 1999 and considered extensively ever since. We also apply this method to the Centralizer KEP, introduced by Shpilrain-Ushakov in 2006. Our method is proved to be of polynomial time using a technical lemma about sampling invertible matrices from a linear space of matrices.
Introduction
Key Exchange Protocols (KEPs) make it possible for two electronic entities, Alice and Bob, to establish a shared secret key over a public communication channel. Since Diffie and Hellman's 1976 breakthrough KEP, few alternative KEP proposals resisted cryptanalysis. This, together with the (presently, theoretical) issue that the Diffie-Hellman and other classic KEPs can be broken in polynomial time by quantum computers, is a strong motivation for searching for substantially different KEPs. Lattice-based KEPs [29] seem to be a viable potential alternative. Both the classic KEPs and the Lattice-based ones are based on commutative algebraic structures.
In 1999, Anshel, Anshel, and Goldfeld [2] (cf. [3] ) introduced the Commutator KEP, a general method for constructing KEPs based on noncommutative algebraic structures. Around the same time, Ko, Lee, Cheon, Han, Kang, and Park [19] introduced the Braid DiffieHellman KEP, another general method achieving the same goal. The security of both KEPs is based on variations of the Conjugacy Search Problem (CSP): Given conjugate elements g, h in a noncommutative group, find x in that group such that x −1 gx = h. Both papers [2] and [19] proposed to use the braid group B N , a finitely presented, infinite noncommutative group parameterized by a natural number N , as the platform group.
The introduction of the Commutator KEP and the Braid Diffie-Hellman KEP was followed by a stream of heuristic attacks (e.g., [14] , [15] , [22] , [13] , [9] , [24] , [10] , [11] , [16] , [23] , [25] , [27] , [28] ), 1 demonstrating that the weak keys of these KEPs constitute a substantial portion of the key space, or more precisely, that the two most natural distributions on the braid group B N seem to give rise to insecure KEPs. Consequently, a program was set forth, by several independent research groups, to find an efficient way to sample hard instances of the underlying computational problems (e.g., [23] , [20] , [12] , [1] ).
Most of the mentioned heuristic attacks address the Commutator KEP, and not the Braid Diffie-Hellman KEP. The reason is that in 2003, Cheon and Jun published a polynomial time cryptanalysis of the Braid Diffie-Hellman KEP, using an ingenious representation theoretic method [6] . In their paper, Cheon and Jun stress that their cryptanalysis does not apply directly to the Commutator KEP. Thus far, no polynomial time attack was found on the Commutator KEP, whose success does not depend on the distributions used to generate the random group elements. The main result of the present paper is a Las Vegas, provable polynomial time cryptanalysis of the Commutator KEP [2] , in the passive adversary model, that succeeds regardless of the distributions used to generate the keys. This cryptanalysis constitutes a polynomial time solution of the underlying computational problem.
The methods developed for the new cryptanalysis are applicable to additional KEPs in the context of group-based cryptography. We present an application of these methods to the Centralizer KEP, introduced by Shpilrain and Ushakov in 2006 [33] , to obtain a polynomial time attack. This is the first cryptanalysis, of any kind, of the Centralizer KEP.
We stress that the Cheon and Jun cryptanalysis and the ones presented here, while of polynomial time, are impractical for standard values of N (e.g., N = 100). These results are of theoretic nature. Ignoring logarithmic factors, the complexity of our cryptanalyses is about N 17 , times a cubic polynomial in the other relevant parameters. Incidentally, though, these cryptanalyses establish the first provable practical attacks in the case where the index N of the braid group B N is small, e.g., when N = 8.
Section 2 introduces the Commutator KEP and the braid group. In Section 3, we eliminate a technical complexity theoretic obstacle. Section 4 applies a method of Cheon and Jun to reduce our problem to matrix groups over finite fields. Section 5 is the main ingredient of our cryptanalysis, cryptanalyzing the Commutator KEP in matrix groups. Section 6 fills a gap in our proof, by applying the Schwartz-Zippel Lemma to obtain a lower bound on the probability that certain random matrices are invertible. Section 7 is a cryptanalysis of the Centralizer KEP, using the methods introduced in the earlier sections. Some final comments and additional applications are provided in Section 8.
2 The Commutator KEP and the braid group B N We will use, throughout, the following basic notation.
Notation 1 For a noncommutative group G and group elements g, x ∈ G, g x := x −1 gx, the conjugate of g by x.
Useful identities involving this notation, that are easy to verify, include g xy = (g x ) y , and g c = g for every central element c ∈ G, that is, such that ch = hc for all h ∈ G. The Commutator KEP [2] is described succinctly in Figure 1 . As conjugation is a group isomorphism, we have that
Thus, Alice can compute the shared key a
, using her secret a, v(x 1 , . . . , x k ) and the public elements a 1 b , . . . , a k b . Similarly, Bob computes a
For the platform group G, it is proposed in [2] to use the braid group B N , a group parameterized by a natural number N . The interested reader will find detailed information on B N in almost each of the papers in the bibliography. We quote here the information needed for the present paper.
Let S N be the symmetric group of permutations on N symbols. For our purposes, the braid group B N is a group of elements of the form
where i is an integer, and p is a finite (possibly, empty) sequence of elements of S N , that is, p = (p 1 , . . . , p ) for some ≥ 0 and p 1 , . . . , p ∈ S N . The sequence p = (p 1 , . . . , p ) is requested to be left weighted (a property whose definition will not be used here), and p 1 must not be the involution p(k) = n − k.
5
Elements of B N are called braids, for they may be identified with braids on N strands. This identification, however, will play no role in the present paper. For "generic" braids (i, (p 1 , . . . , p )) ∈ B N , i is negative and |i| is O( ), but this is not always the case. Note that the bitlength of an element (i, (p 1 , . . . , p )) ∈ B N is O(log |i| + N log N ).
Multiplication is defined on B N by an algorithm of complexity O( 2 N log N + log |i|). Inversion is of linear complexity. Explicit implementations are provided, for example, in [5] .
For a passive adversary to extract the shared key of the Commutator KEP out of the public information, it suffices to solve the following problem.
Problem 2 (Commutator KEP Problem) Let a 1 , . . . , a k , b 1 , . . . , b k ∈ B N , each of the form (i, p) with p of length ≤ . Let a be a product of at most m elements of {a 1 , . . . , a k } ±1 , and let b be a product of at most m elements of {b 1 , . . . ,
Our solution of Problem 2 consists of several ingredients.
Reducing the infimum
The infimum of a braid b = (i, p) is the integer inf(b) := i. As the bitlength of b is O(log |i| + N log N ), an algorithm polynomial in |i| would be at least exponential in the bitlength. We first remove this obstacle.
In cases where p is the empty sequence, we write (i) instead of (i, p). The properties of B N include, among others, the following ones.
This way, every braid b ∈ B N decomposes to a product cb, where c is of the form (2j) (and thus central ), and inf(b) ∈ {0, 1}.
Consider the public information in Figure 1 . For each j = 1, . . . , k, decompose as above
As the elements c j , d j are central, we have that
for all j = 1, . . . , k. Thus,ãb j can be computed for all j. Similarly,bã j can be computed. Now,
This shows that the Commutator KEP Problem is reducible, in linear time, to the same problem usingã 1 , . . . ,
to start with. Assume that henceforth. For a braid x = (i, p), let (p) be the number of permutations in the sequence p.
We use the following basic facts about B N :
Thus, for each
, and therefore, in the notation of our problem, a, b ∈ [−m( + 1), m( + 1)]. Thus,
Corollary 3 In the Commutator KEP Problem, a
4 Reducing to a matrix group over a finite field
Let n be a natural number. As usual, we denote the algebra of all n × n matrices over a field F by M n (F), and the group of invertible elements of this algebra by GL n (F). A matrix group is a subgroup of GL n (F). A faithful representation of a group G in GL n (F) is a group isomorphism from G onto a matrix group H ≤ GL n (F). A group is linear if it has a faithful representation. Bigelow and, independently, Krammer, established in their breakthrough papers [4] , [21] that the braid group B N is linear, by proving that the so-called Lawrence-Krammer representation
whose dimension is
is injective. 6 The Lawrence-Krammer representation of a braid can be computed very efficiently. 7 It is proved implicitly in [21] , and explicitly in [6] , that this representation is also invertible in polynomial time. The following result follows from Corollary 1 of [6] . 6 Bigelow proved this theorem for the coefficient ring Z[t ±1 , q ±1 ] with two variables. Krammer proved, in additiona, that one may replace q by any real number from the interval (0, 1). 7 When the infimum i is polynomial in the other parameters, which we proved in Section 3 that we may assume.
The degrees of t in LK(
In the notation of Theorem 4, Theorem 2 in Cheon-Jun [6] implies that inversion of LK(x) is of order N 6 log M multiplications of entries. Ignoring logarithmic factors and thus assuming that each entry multiplication costs
This complexity is dominated by the complexity of the linear centralizer step of our cryptanalysis (Section 5).
Let us return to the Commutator KEP Problem 2. By Corollary 3,
Let M = 4m( + 1). By Theorem 4, we have that
the absolute values of the coefficients in this matrix are bounded by 2 N 2 (M +1) , and the maximal degree of t in this matrix is bounded by 2M .
Let p be a prime slightly greater than 2 N 2 M , and f (t) be an irreducible polynomial over
F is a finite field of cardinality p d , where d is the degree of f (t). It follows that the complexity of field operations in F is, up to logarithmic factors, of order
Thus, the key K can be recovered as follows:
1. Apply the composed function LK(x) mod (p, f (t)) to the input of the Commutator KEP Problem, to obtain a version of this problem in GL n (F). 2. Solve the problem there, to obtain LK(K) mod (p, f (t)).
Compute K using the Cheon-Jun inversion algorithm.
It remains to devise a polynomial time solution of the Commutator KEP Problem in matrix groups.
Linear centralizers
In this section, we solve the Commutator KEP Problem in matrix groups. We first state the problem in a general form. As usual, for a group G and elements g 1 , . . . , g k ∈ G, g 1 , . . . , g k denotes the subgroup of G generated by g 1 , . . . , g k .
We recall a classic definition.
For a 1 , . . . , a k ∈ M n (F), C({a 1 , . . . , a k }) is also denoted as C(a 1 , . . . , a k ).
Basic properties of C(S), that are easy to verify, include:
where S is the subgroup of GL n (F) generated by S.
A key observation is the following one: Let V be a vector subspace of M n (F), and G ≤ GL n (F) be a matrix group such that V ∩G is nonempty. It may be computationally infeasible to find an element in V ∩ G. However, it is easy to compute a basis for V ∩ U for any vector subspace U of M n (F). In particular, this is true for U = C(C(G)), that contains G. In certain cases, as the ones below, a "random" element in V ∩ C(C(G)) is as good as one in V ∩ G.
Following is an algorithm for the Commutator KEP Problem in a matrix group G ≤ GL n (F). The analysis of this algorithm is based on the forthcoming Lemma 9. To this end, we assume that |F|/n ≥ c > 1 for some constant c. In the above section, |F|/n is at least exponential. Fix a finite set S ⊆ F of cardinality greater than cn (the larger the better), that can be sampled efficiently. In the most important case, where F is a finite field, take S = F. By random element of a vector subspace V of M n (F), with a prescribed basis {v 1 , . . . , v d }, we mean a linear combination
It is natural to split the Commutator KEP Problem and the algorithm for solving it into an offline (preprocessing) phase and an online phase.
Algorithm 7
Offline phase:
by solving the following homogeneous system of linear equations in the n 2 entries of the unknown matrix x:
(b) Compute a basis for C(S) = C(C(b 1 , . . . , b k )), by solving the following homogeneous system of linear equations in the n 2 entries of the unknown matrix x:
Output:
A basis for C(C(b 1 , . . . , b k )).
Online phase:
(a) Solve the following homogeneous system of linear equations in the n 2 entries of the unknown matrix x:
(b) Fix a basis for the solution space, and pick random solutions x until x is invertible. (c) Solve the following homogeneous system of linear equations in the n 2 entries of the unknown matrix y:
subject to the linear constraint that y ∈ C(C(b 1 , . . . , b k )). Let ω be the matrix multiplication constant, that is, the minimal such that matrix multiplication is O(n ω+o(1) ). For our applications, one may take ω = log 2 7 ≈ 2.81. As usual, Las Vegas algorithm means an algorithm that always outputs the correct answer in finite time. For the proof of the following theorem, note that if g x = g y , then g xy −1 = g, or in other words, xy −1 commutes with g.
Theorem 8
Assume that |F|/n ≥ c > 1 for some constant c, and k ≤ n 2 . Algorithm 7 is a Las Vegas algorithm for the Commutator KEP Problem, with running time, in units of field operations:
Proof. We use the notation of Algorithm 7. First, assume that the algorithm terminates. We prove that its output is a −1 b −1 ab.
The equations (2)(a) in the online phase of Algorithm 7 assert that b i x = b i a for all i = 1, . . . , k. Thus, xa −1 ∈ C(b 1 , . . . , b k ). As y ∈ C(C(b 1 , . . . , b k )), y commutes with xa −1 , and therefore so does y −1 . Thus,
By the equations (2)(c) in the online phase of Algorithm 7, a i y = a i b for all i = 1, . . . , k. As a ∈ a 1 , . . . , a k , we have that a y = a b . Indeed, let a = a
As conjugation is an isomorphism,
Running time, offline phase: (2)(a) These are kn 2 equations in n 2 variables, and thus the running time is C(b 1 , . . . , b k ) is a vector subspace of M n (F), its dimension d is at most n 2 . Thus, the running time of this step is O(n 2 · n 2ω ) = O(n 2ω+2 ). Running time, online phase: (2)(a) As in (2)(a) of the offline phase. (2)(b) There is an invertible solution to the equations (2)(a), namely: a. Thus, by the Invertibility Lemma 9, the probability that a random solution is not invertible may be assumed arbitrarily close to n/|F| ≤ 1/c < 1. Thus, the expected number of random elements picked until an invertible one was found is constant. To generate one random element, one takes a linear combination of a basis of the solution space. If d is the dimension, then d ≤ n 2 and the linear combination takes dn 2 ≤ n 4 operations. Checking invertibility is faster. The total expected running time of this step is, therefore, O(n 4 ), and n 4 ≤ n 2ω . (2) 
Finding an invertible solution when there is one
The results in the previous section assume that we are able to find, efficiently, an invertible matrix in any subspace of M n (F) containing an invertible element. This is taken care of by the following Lemma.
Lemma 9 (Invertibility Lemma) Let a 1 , . . . , a m ∈ M n (F) be such that
Let S be a finite subset of F. If α 1 , . . . , α m are chosen uniformly and independently from S, then the probability that
where t 1 , . . . , t m are scalar variables. This is a determinant of a matrix whose coefficients are linear in the variables. By the definition of determinant as a sum of products of n elements, f is a polynomial of degree n. As span{a 1 , . . . , a m } ∩ GL n (F) = ∅, f is nonzero. Apply the Schwartz-Zippel Lemma 10.
For the reader's convenience, we include a proof for the following classic lemma.
Lemma 10 (Schwartz-Zippel) Let f (t 1 , . . . , t m ) ∈ F[t 1 , . . . , t m ] be a nonzero multivariate polynomial of degree n. Let S be a finite subset of F. If α 1 , . . . , α m are chosen uniformly and independently from S, then the probability that f (α 1 , . . . , α m ) = 0 is at least 1 − n |S| .
Proof. By induction on m. If m = 1, then f is a univariate polynomial of degree n, and thus has at most n roots. m > 1: Write For each choice of α 2 , . . . , α m ∈ F with f k (α 2 , . . . , α m ) = 0, f (t 1 , α 2 , . . . , α m ) is a univariate polynomial of degree k in the variable t 1 . By the induction hypothesis (for m = 1), for random α 1 ∈ S, f (α 1 , α 2 , . . . , α m ) is nonzero with probability at least 1 − k/|S|. By the induction hypothesis,
7 Application to the Centralizer KEP Definition 11 For a group G and an element g ∈ G, the centralizer of g in G is the set
The Centralizer KEP, introduced by Shpilrain and Ushakov in 2006 [33] , is described in Figure 2 . In this protocol, a 1 commutes with b 1 and a 2 commutes with b 2 . Consequently, the keys computed by Alice and Bob are identical, and equal to a 1 b 1 ga 2 b 2 .
Alice
Public Bob As in the Commutator KEP, it is proposed in [33] to use the braid group B N as the platform group G. The group elements are chosen in a special way, so as to foil attacks attempted at earlier braid group based KEPs. We apply the methods developed in the previous sections to obtain a polynomial time cryptanalysis of this KEP. We omit some details, that are similar to those in the earlier sections.
, each of the form (i, p) with p of length ≤ . Let a 2 be a product of at most m elements of {h 1 , . . . , h k } ±1 , and let b 1 be a product of at most m elements of
7.1 Solving the Centralizer KEP Problem in matrix groups.
For a group G, Z(G) = C G (G) is the set of all central elements of G. Consider the Centralizer KEP Problem 12 in G ≤ GL n (F) instead of B N . The following variation of this problem is formally harder.
Following is an algorithm for solving it. As before, for S ⊆ M n (F), C(S) (without subscript) is the centralizer of S in the matrix algebra M n (F).
Algorithm 14
(a) Compute bases for the subspaces
subject to the linear constraints x ∈ C(g 1 , . . . , g k ), y ∈ C(C(h 1 , . . . , h k )). (c) Take random linear combinations of the basis of the solution space to obtain solutions (x, y), until y is invertible. 3. Output:
Theorem 15 Let G ≤ GL n (F). Assume that |F|/n ≥ c > 1 for some constant c, and k ≤ n 2 . Algorithm 14 is a Las Vegas algorithm for Problem 13, with running time, in units of field operations, O(n 2ω+2 ).
Proof. The proof is similar to that of Theorem 8. First, assume that the algorithm terminates. We prove that its output is a 1 b 1 ga 2 b 2 . As x ∈ C(g 1 , . . . , g k ) and b 1 ∈ g 1 , . . . , g k , x commutes with b 1 . As b 2 commutes with h 1 , . . . , h k , b 2 ∈ C(h 1 , . . . , h k ). As y ∈ C (C(h 1 , . . . , h k )), y commutes with b 2 , and therefore so does y −1 . Thus,
As xg = a 1 ga 2 y, xgy −1 = a 1 ga 2 . Thus,
Running time: (2)(a) We are solving kn 2 equations in n 2 variables, and then at most n 2 equations in n 2 variables. This is O(n 2ω+2 ). (2)(b) We are solving n 2 equations in 2n 2 variables, which is O(n 2ω ).
(2)(c) Let
be the solution space, and let (x 1 , y 1 ), . . . , (x d , y d ) be a basis for H. As H is a subspace of
Let H 2 = {y : (x, y) ∈ H}, the projection of H on the second coordinate. Then H 2 = span{y 1 , . . . , y d }.
(a 1 , a −1
2 ) ∈ H, and thus a −1
2 ∈ H 2 . In particular, there is an invertible element in H 2 . By the Invertibility Lemma 9, a random linear combination of y 1 , . . . , y d is invertible with probability at least 1/c. The total expected running time of this step is, therefore, O(n 4 ), and n 4 ≤ n 2ω .
Infimum reduction.
In Section 3, we explained how each x ∈ B N can be decomposed (in linear time) as x = cx with c central and inf(x) ∈ {0, 1}. We may assume that inf(g) ∈ {0, 1}.
Indeed, assume that we have an algorithm solving the problem when inf(g) ∈ {0, 1}. Write g = cg with c central and inf(g) ∈ {0, 1}. Compute
Apply the given algorithm tog, g 1 , . . . , g k , h 1 , . . . , h k , a 1g a 2 , b 1g b 2 , to obtain a 1 b 1g a 2 b 2 . Multiply by c to obtain a 1 b 1 ga 2 b 2 . Next, we may assume that
since when we apply Algorithm 14 in the image of our group in a matrix group, we have in Problem 13 that
As in Section 3, it follows that Similarly,
Finally,
Let M = (m + 2)(4 + 6). Continue as in Section 3. By Theorem 4, we have that
the absolute values of the coefficients in this matrix are bounded by 2 N 2 (M +1) , and the maximal degree of t in this matrix is bounded by 2M . Let p be a prime slightly greater than 2 N 2 M , and f (t) be an irreducible polynomial over Z p , of degree d slightly larger than 2M . Then
]/ p, f (t) . F is a finite field of cardinality p d , where d is the degree of f (t). It follows that the complexity of field operations in F is, up to logarithmic factors, of order
, to obtain an input to Problem 13. 2. Solve the problem there, to obtain LK(K ) mod (p, f (t)).
to obtain LK(K ). 5. Compute K using the Cheon-Jun inversion algorithm. 6. Multiply by cd to obtain a 1 b 1 ga 2 b 2 .
Final comments
Ignoring logarithmic factors, the overall complexity of both cryptanalyses presented here is n 2ω+2 = N 4ω+4 field operations, that are of complexity m 3 3 N 2 . Thus, the complexity is
ignoring logarithmic factors. While polynomial, this complexity practical only for braid groups of small index N . However, even the problems of finding polynomial time attacks on the Commutator KEP or on the Centralizer KEP were open up till now. The methods introduced here are also applicable for cryptanalyzing other KEPs. For example, the Invertibility Lemma can be used to turn both the Cheon-Jun cryptanalysis of the Braid Diffie-Hellman KEP [6] and the Shpilrain cryptanalysis of Stickel's KEP [31] into Las Vegas algorithms of expected polynomial time. Our infimum reductions can be applied to the Cheon-Jun attack to eliminate the exponential dependence on the bitlength of the infimum, a technical issue that was apparently not treated thus far.
The major challenge is to reduce the degree of N in the polynomial time cryptanalyses. By Chinese Remaindering or p-adic lifting methods, it may be possible to reduce the complexity contributed by the field operations. Apparently, this may reduce the power of N by 1. It should be possible to make sure that the Invertibility Lemma is still applicable when these methods are used. Much of the complexity comes from the Lawrence-Krammer representation having dimension quadratic in N . It may well be that there are no faithful representations of B N of smaller dimension. Finally, a more careful analysis of the LawrenceKrammer representation may make it possible to obtain finer estimates. However, it does not seem that any of these directions would make the attacks practical for, say, N = 100.
One may wonder whether, from the CS theory point of view, this paper may end up braidbased cryptography. My belief is that this is not the csae. I do not at present know whether Kurt's Triple Decomposition KEP [26, 4.2.5] can be cryptanalyzed using the methods presented here. Additional KEPs to which the present methods do not seem to be applicable are introduced by Kalka in [17] and [18] . Moreover, there are additional types of braid-based schemes (e.g., authentication schemes), that cannot be attacked using the methods presented here. Some examples are reviewed in the monograph [26] .
Changing the platform group in any of the studied KEPs is a very interesting option. There are efficiently implementable, infinite groups with no faithful representations as matrix groups. As for finite groups, I am pessimistic. For example, finite simple groups tend to be linear, by the classification of finite simple groups, and our method would reduce the cryptanalysis to the problem of finding an efficient linear representation. There are at present no signs that such representations must be harder to evaluate (or invert) than, say, solving the discrete logarithm problem in Z * p .
